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This paper presents the security evaluation, energy consumption optimization, and spectrum scarcity analysis of artificial noise
techniques to increase physical-layer security in Cognitive Wireless Sensor Networks (CWSNs). These techniques introduce noise
into the spectrum in order to hide real information. Nevertheless, they directly affect two important parameters in Cognitive
Wireless Sensor Networks (CWSNs), energy consumption and spectrum utilization. Both are affected because the number of
packets transmitted by the network and the active period of the nodes increase. Security evaluation demonstrates that these
techniques are effective against eavesdropper attacks, but also optimization allows for the implementation of these approaches
in low-resource networks such as Cognitive Wireless Sensor Networks. In this work, the scenario is formally modeled and the
optimization according to the simulation results and the impact analysis over the frequency spectrum are presented.
1. Introduction
One of the fastest growing sectors in recent years has
undoubtedly been that ofWireless Sensor Networks (WSNs).
WSNs consist of spatially distributed autonomous sensors
that monitor a wide range of ambient conditions and cooper-
ate to share data across the network. WSNs are increasingly
being introduced into our daily lives. Potential fields of
applications can be found, ranging from themilitary to home
control commercially or industrially, to name a few. The
emergence of new wireless technologies such as Zigbee and
IEEE 802.15.4 has allowed for the development of interop-
erability among commercial products, which is important
for ensuring scalability and low cost. Most WSN solutions
operate on unlicensed frequency bands. In general, they
use Industrial, Scientific, and Medical (ISM) bands, like the
worldwide available 2.4GHz band. This band is also used by
a large number of popular wireless applications, for example,
those that work over Wi-Fi or Bluetooth. For this reason,
unlicensed spectrum bands are becoming overcrowded. As a
result, coexistence issues on unlicensed bands have been the
subject of extensive research, and in particular, it has been
shown that IEEE 802.11 networks can significantly degrade
the performance of Zigbee/802.15.4 networkswhen operating
on overlapping frequency bands [1]. The increasing demand
for wireless communication presents a challenge to make
efficient use of the spectrum. To address this challenge,
Cognitive Radio (CR) [2] has emerged as the key technology,
which enables opportunistic access to the spectrum. A CR
is an intelligent wireless communication system that is
aware of its surrounding environment and adapts its internal
parameters to achieve reliable and efficient communication.
These new networks have a lot of applications, such as the
cognitive use of the TV white space spectrum or making
secure calls in emergency situations. Adding cognition to
the existing WSN infrastructure brings about many benefits.
However, cognitive technologywill not only provide access to
new spectrum bands but will also provide better propagation
characteristics. By adaptively changing system parameters
like modulation schemes, transmit power, carrier frequency,
and constellation size, a wide variety of data rates can be
achieved. This will certainly improve power consumption,
network life, and reliability in a WSN.
The broadcast characteristic of the wireless medium
makes it difficult to shield transmitted signals from unin-
tended recipients. Security in wireless data transmission has
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traditionally been performed using cryptographic techniques
at the network layer. The main drawback of this approach
when deployed to WSN consists in their limited resources,
which cannot support the execution of complicated encryp-
tion algorithms, resulting in shorter keys that are easier to
discover. WSN nodes can also be captured and by using
reverse engineering, attackers can turn them for use in their
own benefit.
Physical-layer security has become a very interesting
approach in the past few years [3]. The main idea behind
physical-layer security is to limit the amount of information
that can be extracted at the bit level by unauthorized receivers
with the exploitation of all available channel state information
(CSI). The fundamental problem of WSN is the difficulty to
obtain a full CSI.The cognitive paradigm allows for spectrum
monitoring and provides this information to the network.
Cognitive features such as spectrum sensing, adaptation,
and collaboration involve more resources in terms of energy
consumption and spectrum saturation. Security mechanisms
also make these problems worse. Therefore, the analysis,
but also the optimization of the technique, is essential for
CognitiveWireless Sensor Network scenarios, where compu-
tational and energy resources are very limited.
Another difference between Cognitive Networks and
CWSNs is the role of Primary Users (PUs) and Secondary
Users (SUs). We assume a different behavior for the SUs
and PUs in CWSNs because of the nature of these networks.
For example, CWSNs usually operate on ISM bands, where
anyone can transmit without a license. Because of this feature,
the definition of Primary Users (PUs) and Secondary Users
(SUs) should be different. For this CWSNs definition, the
differences between PUs and SUs are based on the priority
of their functionality. For example, a fire sensor would have
more priority than a temperature sensor. While PUs take
preference because they are responsible for critical sensors
and information; SUs only send the information when the
channel is free.
This paper presents the evaluation, the energy opti-
mization, and the spectrum scarcity analysis of artificial
noise techniques to increase physical-layer security in Cog-
nitiveWireless Sensor Networks (CWSNs).These approaches
introduce noise in the spectrum in order to hide the real
information. They can operate independently of the higher
layers in order to complement security. The limitation of
resources is one of the motivations in order to integrate this
security approach that complements higher-level techniques,
such as encryption or specific routing. In other scenarios with
fewer limitations, encryption could be a good solution, but in
WSNs the encryption algorithms are not strong enough and
advanced attackers can decrypt the real information easily.
The introduction of noise into the area makes the obtaining
and decryption process much more difficult for attackers.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2
shows a related work about physical-layer security strate-
gies. Section 3 indicates the specific characteristics of the
presented scenario in the work. Then, Section 4 presents in
more detail the approach and Section 5 the evaluation, the
optimization, and the simulation results. Finally, Section 6
summarizes the main conclusions of this work.
2. Physical-Layer Security Approaches
The physical-layer security in CWSN is a new area where the
investigation is in a very early state. Moreover, the energy
optimization of these techniques has not been investigated
yet. There are some previous researches about efficient trans-
missions [4] or spectrum sensing [5], but there is not energy
optimization or spectrum analysis for security approaches in
CWSN.
Therefore, in this section, we introduce schemes that
could be used to achieve physical-layer security against
different attacks inWSNs, which share common features with
CWSN.
In recent years, themain issues of secure channel capacity
have drawn much attention within the information theory
community. Most of the works are focused on schemes
to obtain the secrecy capacity with different Channel State
Information (CSI) approaches. Barros and Rodrigues [6]
developed a secure communication protocol to ensure wire-
less information-theoretic security based on common ran-
domness via opportunistic transmission, message reconcilia-
tion, common key generation via privacy amplification, and,
finally, message protection with a secret key. It was shown
that the protocol is effective in secure key renewal even in the
presence of imperfect CSI.
Othermethods have beenproposed to avoid attacks based
on the exploitation of channel characteristics. The RF finger-
printing system implemented by Sperandio and Flikkema [7]
consists of amultiple sensor system that captures and extracts
RF features from each receiver signal. An intrusion detector
processes the feature sets and generates a dynamic fingerprint
for each internal source identifier derived from a few packets.
This system monitors the temporal evolution and alerts
when a strange fingerprint is detected. In [8] Li and Ratazzi
propose a precoding scheme, in which the transmitted code
vectors are generated by singular value decomposition of the
correlationmatrix, which describes the channel characteristic
features between the transmitter and the intended receiver.
Due to the differences in the multipath structure of the
transmitter-receiver channels, even intruders with a perfect
knowledge of the transmission code vectors are not able to
acquire the true messages due to the difference between the
locations of the intruders and the legitimate users.
Code approaches improve resilience against jamming and
eavesdropping. In [9], a combination of turbo coding and the
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) cryptosystem is pro-
posed. An error in the received ciphertext can cause a large
number of errors in plaintext after decoding. Depending on
the channel condition, this method can be adopted to choose
the number of redundant bits required to protect the informa-
tion, in order to achieve high efficiency. Another technique
is the Spread Spectrum Coding, in which signal is spread by
a pseudo-noise sequence over a wide-frequency bandwidth
much wider than that contained in the frequency ambit
of the original information. The main difference between
convention cryptographic systems and spread-spectrum sys-
tems lies in their key sizes. Traditional systems can have a
very large key space. However, in a spread-spectrum system,
the key space is limited by the range of carrier frequencies
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and the number of different sequences. In [10], a method is
proposed to enhance the physical-layer security of a CDMA
system by using AES operations to generate the scrambling
sequences. Data protection can also be provided using power
approaches. The method proposed in [11] ensures secure
communications depending on the channels condition. This
method shows that a good secrecy can be achieved when
the intruders channel is noisier than the receiver’s channel.
Artificial noise is generated using multiple antennas or the
coordination of helping nodes and is injected into the null
subspace of the intended receivers channel.
Discriminatory channel estimation is performed by
injecting artificial noise to the left null space of the legitimate
receivers channel to degrade the estimation performance of
the eavesdropper [12]. By exploiting the channel feedback
information from the legitimate receiver at the beginning
of each communication stage, a multistage training-based
channel estimation scheme is proposed [13]. It focuses on
minimizing the normalized mean squared error of the
channel estimation at the legitimate receiver subject to a
constraint on the estimation performance attainable by the
nonlegitimate receiver.
Most of these approaches can be improved using cogni-
tive capabilities. The cognitive paradigm [14] provides a new
scenario thanks to spectrum sensing, protocols to share infor-
mation, and collaboration to optimize the communications.
The works presented in this section support the idea of
artificial noise as a possible security option both inWSN and
CWSN, but energy optimization and spectrum saturation are
two fundamental keys in CWSNs that should be analyzed.
3. Assumptions and CWSN Scenario
In this section, the network and adversary models studied in
this paper are described. This is necessary in order to define
where the proposed technique is applicable.
3.1. Network Model. In our model, a CWSN consists of a
set 𝑆 = {𝑠
1
, 𝑠
2
, . . . , 𝑠
𝑛
} of 𝑛 cognitive wireless sensor nodes.
Each node can communicate with other nodes within certain
range.
All nodes have cognitive capabilities.Thus, each node has
𝑁
𝑊
different wireless configurations (physical channels and
modulations). All sensors run some discovery routine and
they can record the current spectrum state. We also assume
that all these nodes can collude among themselves, sharing
information and selecting the best available communication
configuration. We further assume the existence of a Virtual
Control Channel (VCC) to share this information, with no
extra overhead over regular cognitive communications.
We consider a four-terminal system composed of a
legitimate source (𝑆) that sends the message to a legitimate
destination (𝐷), one ormore relay nodes (𝑅), and one ormore
eavesdroppers (𝐸). Because of the cognitive capabilities there
are no multipath routing schemes; only one path is chosen
each time for the communication.
The above assumptions are light and realistic, considering
usualWSN scenarios such us housemonitoring,military, and
infrastructure protection.
Table 1: Power consumption with different measurement methods.
TX/RX mode (0 dBm) Sleep mode
An ammeter 28mA 160 uA
Dig. ammeter 27,7mA 146,6 uA
Oscilloscope 26,7mA 0mA
3.2. Adversary Model. In this system model the adversaries
are eavesdroppers. We assume a global adversary controlling
some eavesdroppers which can collaboratively overhear all
messages on the incoming and outgoing channels of the
closer sensor nodes. Our eavesdropper model is captured
by the following set of assumptions for the eavesdropper
𝐸: (i) 𝐸 is a wireless node with 𝑁
𝐾
wireless configurations
(where𝑁
𝐾
≤ 𝑁
𝑊
); (ii)𝐸 can perform sophisticated spectrum
processing with its available elements; (iii) network does not
have any information about the position of 𝐸 or its strategy;
(iv) the eavesdroppers communicate among themselves via
a separate channel invisible to the rest of the network. We
point out that the assumption of a global eavesdropper who
can monitor the entire network traffic is realistic for some
applications.
We also assume that the eavesdroppers are passive; hence
they cannot transmit noise signals. One eavesdropper can
sense the spectrum using its different wireless configuration.
They can collude among themselves, sharing information to
obtain a global spectrum state.
We define the behavior of the eavesdroppers according to
these assumptions:
(i) the eavesdroppers have cognitive capabilities, such as
multiple interfaces or spectrum sensing,
(ii) the eavesdroppers sense the available channels and
interfaces during a period of time. If they do not
locate any signal they commute to the next channel
or interface,
(iii) if an eavesdropper detects a signal, it will listen during
a period of time in the same channel.
3.3. Power Consumption Model. The power consumption
model used in this work represents the Texas Instruments
CC2530 System-on-Chip Solution for 2.4GHz IEEE 802.15.4
and ZigBee Applications transceiver [15] and the rest of the
hardware consumptions. The hardware power consumption,
excluding the radio interfaces, is modeled constantly because
we assume it is negligible against the wireless transceivers
ones.
The model has been completed with real data extracted
from measurements in the Texas Instruments SmartRF05
evaluation board. These measurements include power con-
sumption in transmission, reception, and sleepmodes.More-
over, the model includes the power consumption in the
transition between modes and the time spent on it.
The measurements in Table 1 are consistent with the the-
oretical values supported by the company.This table presents
the measures captured in real devices that complement the
simulator. The theoretical transmission power in 0 dBm is
between 28.1 and 29.2mA. The sleep mode consumption
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Table 2: Delay transition matrix in CC2530.
TX RX Sleep
TX — 192ms 120ms
RX 192ms — 120ms
Sleep 120ms 120ms —
measure was the mode 2. Theoretically, the consumption in
this mode is 190 uA. As we can see the transmission and
reception modes consume the same energy, indicating the
activation of the RF module.
Switch times among modes are based on the hardware
specification. The delay transition matrix can be observed in
Table 2.
4. Cooperative Artificial Noise Scheme
The key idea in this paper is that a transmitter, in cooperation
with helper nodes, can artificially generate noise to conceal
the secret message that it is transmitting. The noise is
generated in such a way that only the eavesdropper is affected
but the intended receiver is not because noise is generated in
an orthogonal channel or modulation.This technique creates
a difficulty in obtaining real information and also in the
decryption process in the worst case, when the eavesdropper
senses real packets.
CWSNs avoid one of the main constraints when using
artificial noise injection techniques, the knowledge of the
channel state information (CSI). In this approach, otherwise
inactive nodes in the relay network can be used as cooperative
artificial noise sources to confuse the eavesdropper and
provide better performance in terms of security. In addition,
we allow noncolluding eavesdroppers (𝐸) to individually
overhear the communication between 𝑆 and 𝐷 without
any central processing. Based on [16] idea, adapting these
concepts to new scenarios, a formal modeling is presented.
Zhou and McKay present the base of this modeling in a
multiantenna scenario. In this work, the scenario is formally
modeled based on this mathematical base and adapted to a
cognitive scenario, where the collaboration and the spectrum
sensing can be used to improve the technique. Moreover, in
[16] there are no relay nodes; the nodes can transmit at the
same time for more than one antenna and there is no any
presented optimization according the spectrum saturation or
the energy consumption.
We denote the possible wireless configurations between 𝑆
and 𝐷 and between 𝑆 and 𝐸 as ℎ and 𝑔, respectively, both of
which are 1×𝑁
𝑊
vectors, where𝑁
𝑊
is the number of different
wireless configurations in 𝑆:
ℎ = {ℎ
1
, . . . ℎ
𝑁𝑊
} ,
𝑔 = {𝑔
1
, . . . 𝑔
𝑁𝑊
} .
(1)
The elements of ℎ and 𝑔 are independent and identically
distributed complex Gaussian random variables:
ℎ
𝑖
, 𝑔
𝑖
= ℎ
𝑖
(𝑡) , 𝑔
𝑖
(𝑡) =
1
𝜎√2𝜋
𝑒
−𝑡/2𝜎. (2)
Knowledge of ℎ is obtained using spectrum sensing
capabilities. We assume that the knowledge of ℎ and 𝑔 is
available at𝐸, whichmakes the secrecy of the communication
independent of the wireless configuration and the channel.
𝑆 utilizes multiple wireless configurations to transmit the
information-bearing signal into the receiver’s channel, while
simultaneously generating a noise-like signal into the null
space of the receiver’s channel. We let an 𝑁
𝑊
× 𝑁
𝑊
matrix
𝑊 = [𝑤
1
𝑊
2
] be an orthonormal basis of C𝑁𝑊 , where
𝑤
1
= ℎ/‖ℎ‖ and 𝑊
2
, is orthonormal to ℎ. The transmitted
symbol vector at 𝑆 is given by 𝑥 = 𝑤
1
𝑢 + 𝑊
2
V, where the
variance of the information symbol 𝑢 is 𝜎2
𝑢
and the 𝑁
𝑊
− 1
elements of V are independent and identically distributed
complex Gaussian random variables, each with a variance of
𝜎
2
V . The information-bearing signal is represented by 𝑢 and V
represents the artificial noise.Therefore, the received symbols
at𝐷 and 𝐸 are given, respectively, by
𝑦
𝐷
= ℎ𝑥 + 𝑛 = ℎ𝑤
1
𝑢 + ℎ𝑊
2
V + 𝑛 = ‖ℎ‖2𝑢 + 𝑛, (3)
𝑦
𝐸
= 𝐺𝑥 + 𝑒 = 𝐺𝑤
1
𝑢 + 𝐺𝑊
2
V + 𝑒, (4)
where 𝑛 and 𝑒 are the additivewhiteGaussian noises (AWGN)
in 𝐷 and 𝐸 with variances of 𝜎2
𝑛
and 𝜎2
𝑒
, respectively. 𝐺
is a matrix 𝑁
𝐸
× 𝑁
𝑤
, where the 𝑁
𝐸
is the number of
eavesdroppers.We see in (3) that𝑤
1
spans the null space of ℎ;
hence the artificial noise V does not affect the received signal
at𝐷.
However, the received signal in 𝐸 is a combination of two
unknown Gaussian distributions. Even though 𝐸 knows ℎ
and 𝐺 channel affection, it does not know the weights𝑊, so
it is impossible for it to distinguish the signal 𝑢 and the noise
V. We consider a total power per transmission denoted by 𝑃:
𝑃 = 𝜎
2
𝑢
+ (𝑁
𝑊
− 1) 𝜎
2
V . (5)
We refer to 𝑃/𝜎2
𝑛
as the transmission signal-to-noise
ratio (SNR). As an important characteristic of this scheme
and a conclusion of the model, the artificial noise is always
generated in the orthonormal channels of the information.
Therefore, we assume that the noise does not affect the
legitimate transmissions.
5. Results
In order to compare the security using this cooperative
artificial noise technique with systems without physical-
layer security strategies, metrics are necessary. For this
purpose the secrecy rate and the secrecy outage probability
are defined. The secrecy rate is the rate of transmission
on the main channel that remains undecodable to the
eavesdropper. When larger networks with multiple transmit-
ters/receivers/eavesdroppers, as well as additional nodes such
as relays, are considered, we can define the corresponding
secrecy rate regions, or the aggregate secrecy sum rate.
A performance metric suitable for nonergodic channels
is the secrecy outage probability (SOP), which describes the
probability that a target secrecy rate is not achieved.The SOP
characterizes the likelihood of simultaneously reliable and
secure data transmission.
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Figure 1: SOP for different emitter and noise power with 5 jamming
nodes.
The efficacy of this scheme for different example scenarios
using these metrics is presented. In order to simulate the
attacks and the countermeasures, a CWSN simulator [17]
has been used. This simulator has been developed over
the well-known Castalia simulator [18]. Our modifications
improve Castalia and include new cognitive features. The
CWSN simulator responsibilities are scenario definition,
simulation of the spectrum state, communications between
nodes, and implementation of cognitive behaviors, attacks,
and countermeasures.
Ten scenarios have been executed in the simulator to
extract results and to draw conclusions from the work. The
scenarios have some common characteristics.
(i) The scenario area is a 50m × 50m square.
(ii) The complete simulation time is 100 seconds.
(iii) Thenumber of nodes in the simulation varies between
4 and 53, including one emitter node (𝑆), one destina-
tion node (𝐷), one eavesdropper attacker (𝐸), and a
variable number of secondary users that implement
the relay and the jamming functions (𝑅).
(iv) The emitter node sends 1 packet/s.
(v) The attack starts at the beginning of the simulation.
(vi) The eavesdropper nodes sense each channel for 50ms.
If in this time they do not detect a signal, they change
to the next channel. However, if a signal is detected
the eavesdropper will listen to the same channel for
five seconds.
The variable parameters in the scenarios are as follows:
(i) the number of relay nodes (𝑅),
(ii) the power transmission of the relay nodes (𝑅),
(iii) the power transmission of the emitter node (𝑆).
We have developed some graphics that summarize the
results. In Figure 1, SOP for different emitter and noise power
is presented. The number of nodes in the simulation is (7),
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Figure 2: SOP for different emitting and noise power with 20
jamming nodes.
including one source user, one destination node, and one
eavesdropper in a 50 × 50 meters scenario. As we can see in
the graph, there is a zone that provides the optimal relation
between security SOP metric and noise power. Less noise
power implies higher SOP rates. More noise power does
not improve the security enough, and it affects the energy
consumption and the spectrum performance.
In order to determine the influence of collaboration
nodes over the network behavior, a new scenario has been
simulated. Using the same 50 × 50 meter zone, the number
of nodes in the simulation is 23, including one source user,
emitting 1 packet/s, one destination, and one eavesdropper
with 20 jamming nodes, emitting a rate between 1 and
1.1 packet/s. The shape in Figure 2 is similar to the one in
the previous scenario. For high noise power the SOP level
is lower than the one with 5 jamming nodes, between 2
and 5%, depending on the transmission power. This SOP is
maintained for very low noise power, beyond 0.1mW. There
is also a zone where the relation between emission and noise
power is optimal. This zone is shown in Figure 2.
Once the technique has been validated for security
reasons and the results have been analyzed, the optimization
and the impact in energy consumption should be analyzed.
The next results show the energy optimization that consists
of searching for the minimum resource utilization in order to
achieve the security goals.
Figure 3 represents the additional power consumption
that the jamming nodes introduce into the network. As
we can see, there is almost no dependence between the
emitter power and the power consumption of the jamming
nodes. The quadratic form of the curve is derived from
the omnidirectional antenna that simulates the nodes, with
a circular range. The number of nodes affected by the
transmissions of the others increases with 𝑟2. In Figure 3
it can be appreciated that the network without using the
noise technique has an energy consumption over 65 joules.
This value can be increased to 250 Jules if the sensors that
emit noise transmitted 1mW. This is an additional energy
consumption of more than 350%.
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Figure 3: Additional power consumption in the network with 20
jamming nodes.
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Figure 4: Jamming power variable. Function of SOP and additional
power with 𝐴 = 1 and 𝐵 = 1.
If we can weigh the security and the consumption of the
system, a formula similar to the next one will be a good
solution:
𝐹 (SOP,POWER) = 𝐴 ⋅ SOP + 𝐵 ⋅ POWER, (6)
where POWER is the additional consumption ponderated to
100 like the SOP. 𝐴 and 𝐵 are the weights that the designer
can control to give more importance to the security or the
power consumption. Depending on these weights, Figure 4
has a different minimum. Figure 4 represents formula (6)
with 𝐴 = 1 and 𝐵 = 1. Table 3 summarizes some optimum
results for different values of 𝐴 and 𝐵. As we can appreciate,
using a power noise transmission of 0.07mW, the SOP can be
reduced to 4.5% in the best case.
A different approach is tomodify the number of jamming
nodes keeping the jamming power constant. Figure 5 shows
the SOP for different simulations with a variable number of
jamming nodes, from 1 to 19. As in the previous simulations,
there is a zone where the SOP is very high, when the number
Table 3: Optimum values for different weights.
A B Pjamming SOP Power
1 3 0,01mW 48,8%–23,76% 69 J
1 2 0,04mW 22,6%–11,73% 77 J
1 1 0,07mW 11%–4,5% 95 J
3 1 0,1mW 8,1%–4% 100 J
10 1 0,19mW 5,6%–3% 128 J
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Figure 5: SOP for different number of jamming nodes.
of jamming nodes is low, and a zone where the SOP does not
decrease a lot, with more than 5 nodes.
The additional power consumption has a quadratic form,
similar to that in Figure 3. It increases with the number of
jamming nodes. If we create the same formula as in the first
experiments, the results are shown in Figure 6.
A conclusion extracted from Figure 6 is that the use of
more than 5 jamming nodes does not provide improvements
in the optimizer function.
Figure 7 represents the curves for different values of𝐴 and
𝐵when we select a constant emitter power of 0 dBm. It can be
seen that if the security (𝐴) has more weight in the formula
than the consumption (𝐵), the minimum solution requires
a higher number of jamming nodes. It can be observed that
the optimal solutions for the weights represented in Figure 7
are between 3 and 7 jamming nodes. This indicates that
increasing the number of jamming nodes makes the network
consume more energy without benefits in security.
Finally, to complete the analysis with power consump-
tion, we have simulated a new scenario in order to analyze
the behavior of the system when spectrum saturation is
higher. In this case, the simulation has 10 emitter nodes
transmitting 10 packets/s. This is 100 times more traffic than
in the previous simulations.We have observed that the results
have a similar distribution with the difference that in this
case the SOP decreases drastically. However, this is due to the
attack model in which the listening time in a channel with
signal is much longer than the sensing time for each channel.
This is an important result because spectrum efficiency is
the most important goal of cognitive radio. If this approach
International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks 7
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Figure 6: Number of jamming nodes variable. Function of SOP and
additional power with 𝐴 = 1 and 𝐵 = 1.
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Figure 7: Number of jamming nodes variable and emitter power
0 dBm. Function of SOP and additional power with different values
of 𝐴 and 𝐵.
significantly affects the spectrum occupancy, it would not be
feasible.
A similar analysis has been made with spectrum utiliza-
tion. This is an important resource that cognitive radio tries
to use in amore efficient way.Therefore, this approach should
be analyzed in order to have the minimum possible affect.
Figure 8 shows the SOP results for a variable jamming and
emission rate. As we can appreciate, for low jamming rates
(<0.2 packets/s) the SOP decreases quickly, but for higher
values (>0.4 packets/s) the SOP is constant. This indicates
that the optimumvalue in order to preserve the spectrumwill
be between 0.2 and 0.4 packets/s.
Figure 9 shows the conclusions specified before. Here, as
in the power consumption experiments, an objective function
is represented by (7). The figure shows that the optimal
jamming rate for all the simulated scenarios is between 0.20
and 0.30 packets/s when𝐴 = 𝐵 = 1. To increase the jamming
rate above 0.30 packet/s costs more spectrum saturation than
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Figure 8: SOP for different emitter and jamming rates.
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Figure 9: Function of SOP and jamming rate with𝐴 = 1 and 𝐵 = 1.
security benefits:
𝐹 (SOP,POWER) = 𝐴 ⋅ SOP + 𝐵 ⋅ BW. (7)
Finally, Figure 10 and Table 4 show the optimum values
for the objective function when the emission rate is constant
and the weights 𝐴 and 𝐵 change. Here have been analyzed
low packet rates, under 1 packet/s. The SOP rates are under
10% with a jamming rate over 0.45 packet/s.
6. Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we present an evaluation and energy con-
sumption optimization and spectrum scarcity analysis of a
cooperative artificial noise injection strategy for physical-
layer security inmultiuser cognitive wireless sensor networks
as a supplement to encryption at higher layers.The generation
of artificial noise makes the extraction of information from
the spectrum difficult but also complements the upper layers
security mechanisms, such as cryptography, making more
difficult the decryption process of a noisy signal. According
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Figure 10: Function of SOP and jamming rate with different values
of 𝐴 and 𝐵 and emitter rate 0.1 packets/s.
Table 4: Optimum values for different weights with jamming rate
variable.
A B Jamming rate SOP
1 3 0,05 pps 62,8–41,6%
1 2 0,25 pps 19,6–11,1%
1 1 0,25 pps 19,6–11,1%
2 1 0,35 pps 12,8–8,2%
3 1 0,45 pps 9,35–77,75%
to the CWSN scenario it is necessary to optimize the noise
generation. Because of the CWSN nature noise affects power
consumption and spectrum occupancy.
Cooperative artificial noise strategies with assistance
from external helpers or inactive neighboring nodes are
seen to be highly effective for increasing the secrecy of
the transmitted data. Of course, a trade-off between energy
consumption (additional sensor power consumption spent
on transmission of noise), spectrum scarcity, and security
level is necessary.
A cognitive simulation framework has been used to
simulate the different scenarios. The eavesdropper attack
model is always the same.Thework is focused on the artificial
noise strategy and energy optimization but in the future it will
be interesting to hold a study with different attack models.
From the simulation results, we showed that there are
different optimum solutions according to an objective func-
tionwith differentweights for energy consumption, spectrum
scarcity, and security.
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